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RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATION LAW
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES.
By GEoRGE WHARTON PEPPZR,

Esq.

At the end of the century which has seen the birth of themodern business corporation it may be said without exaggeration that many fundamental questions in regard to the legal
status of corporations are still unsettled and that authorities
are not at one in regard to the scientific explanation of cor-porate phenomena of every day occurrence. The nature of a
corporation is still under discussion, and it may be doubted
whether any six learned judges would to-day give explana-tions even substantially similar of the difference between corporations and joint stock companies or statutory partnerships.
The result of this conflict of opinion in regard to the nature of*
a corporation is seen in the diversity of doctrine in the matter
of the status of persons who have engaged in business nominally as a corporation but without complying with all the
formalities prescribed by the general corporation law underwhich they are associated. Can a creditor who has dealt with
them as a corporation take advantage of the defect in organization and treat the associates as partners ? The answer of'
many authorities is in the negative' and of many others in the
affirmative
Of the former class MORAWETZ is one who
presses the view of a de facto corporation so far' that, to be
consistent, he would be compelled to admit that, for some purposes, persons may become in law a corporation without
I Cochran v.

Arnold, 58 Pa. .399; Eaton v. Aspiinwall, i

Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. Law, 599 ; M~orawetz,

cited.

N, Y. 119 ;

748-and cases there

2 Kaiserv. Bank, 56 Iowa, o4 ; l7forawetz, P748--and cases there cited.,
3

745.
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-entering into any relation to the state and without deriving froim
4
the state the vital spark of corporate life which English jurists
have been wont to hold that the sovereign alone can dispense.
In fact he speaks of "the formatioh of a corporation without
.authority of law." 5 Of the latter class is PARSONS,' who would
distinguish between defective organization, under a special
.charter and under a general corporation law, holding that where
the state permits self-incorporation, the conditions of immunity
must be exactly complied with, or the associates will continue
to be partners with an unlimited liability. 7 The obvious justice attained as a result of the former view and, the obvious
in;ustice which would follow from the latter, predispose the
mind in favor of limiting the creditor's right to recover. At the
same time such an explanation -as that of MORAWETZ seems so
unsound upon principle that one hesitates to accept it. The
same remark applies to the theory advocated in New Jersey
and elsewhere that the creditor's right will be limited,
because the creditor is estoped from questioning the legality
of the corporate existence.8 It is, perhaps, not too much to
expect that the courts will hereafter find the solution of the
difficulty in a scrutiny of the true significance of the contract
between the creditor and his debtors in such a case, admitting,
at the same time, that no corporation of any kind has come
into existence. As it would be entirely competent for the
creditor of a partnership to agree in express terms that he
would limit his right of recourse to the contributions of the
partners,9 it should seem that no more rational explanation of
the true meaning of the contract could be offered in the case
suggested than that the parties had done by implication that
which they might have accomplished by express words.
4
See Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, p. 470. The
chapter on "Fictitious Persons" is extremely interesting and suggestive.
(Little, Brown & Co., Boston. 1895.)
5See Vol. II, Chap. IX.
6Parsons, (James) :Partnership, 24.
"Parsons answers satisfactorily the argument of Morawetz, that if
-members of a defacto corporation are not protected from partnership
liability, the stockholders of a corporation de jure must be charged indi-vidually for ultra vires acts, 24.
8Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. Law, 599.
9Brown v. Slate Co., 134 Mass. 590.

298

RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATION LAW

.There is great diversity of opinion in regard to many of the
most-important questions relating to corporate mortgages. To
what extent is it true that corporate bonds are negotiable?
What is the legal effect of the certificate by a mortgage
trustee endorsed upon a bond that the bond is what it purports to be, and that it is entitled to the security of a certain
mortgage or trust deed ? How far can a subsequent holder
of a bond compel the performance by the corporation mortgagor of covenants in the mortgage instrument that the mortgagor will use the borrowed moneys to feed the lender's
security ? What is the standard of the duties of a mortgage
trustee ? These are questions of vital importance. If there
is any doubt that the law on these subjects is unsettled, a
0
reference to Belden v. Burke"
will dispel the doubt. The views
of the court below and of the Supreme Court of New York
disclose a great diversity of view; and while the conclusion
of the Supreme Court seems to be tindoubtedly correct many
of the questions involved may be said to be of "first impression."
Again, there are almost as many views of corporatepower
in England and in this country as there are tribunals with
jurisdiction to pass upon the question. What contracts may
a corporation make? On what theory may it make them?
What are the rights of parties to an unauthorized or prohibited
contract after it has been wholly or partially performed?
What is the true distinction between the strictly private corporation and the so-called "quasi-public" corporation in this.
respect?
Again, in what sense, if in any sense,*is the property of a
corporation a trust fund for the payment of creditors? Is a
stockholder, who has not yet paid the instalments on his shares.
entitled to set off against the corporation's claim, a debt due
by the corporation to him? If not, (and it has been decided
by high authority that he is not so entitled,)" what is thetrue ground upon which to base the denial of his right?Can a corporation prefer its creditors? Is MORAWETZ right
'079 Hun. 51.

"Sawyer

v. Hoag, 17

Wall. 61o.
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in contending that a preference is in conflict with principle? 2
Or, is it true that until an insolvent corporation gets into the
hands of a court of equity, it has the same power of disposition over its assets as if it were a natural person ?"3 If a preference in favor of a general creditor is permitted, is the rule
the same where that creditor is also a stockholder? If the,
preference is permitted in favor of a stockholder, what is to
be said of a case in which the preferred creditor is a
director? 4 Can an unsecured creditor file a bill in equity
against the stockholders of a corporation without first obtaining a judgment at ltw, calling upon them to .pay the instalments which remain unpaid upon their stock? If not, (and
the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a
creditor has no such right,)"5 how can the court consistently
continue to assert that the capital stock of a corporation paid
and unpaid- is affected with a trust in favor of creditors ?
No decisions are *more interesting than those decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, in which during the
Jast five years that august tribunal has discussed the questions
which fall under the last two heads just referred to-" Corporate Power" and the " Rights of Stockholders and Creditors in the Property of the Corporation." It is proposed to
take a brief survey of the most important recent decisions of
the court which deal with these problems.
I.

CORPORATE POWER.

The five-year period, which has been arbitrarily selected for
examination, may be said to be marked in its beginning by
the decision in Central Transportation Company v. Pdllnan's
Palace Car Comrpany,17 which was argued in January, 189o.
The decision in that dase is well known to the profession. A
corporation was organized under the general manufacturing
12

803.

13Graham v. R. R., 102 U. S.
150 U. S. 371.

148 ; Hollins v. .Rriersfield, etc., Co.,

" Re Vincham Co., L. R.. 9 Ch. Div. 522; Opinion of JEssEr, M. R.
15Hollins v. BrierfieldCo., 150 U. S. 371.
16Case v. Beauregard,9 9 U. S. i19.
17139 U. S. 24.
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corporation law of Pennsylvania, and the purpose of its incorporation was stated to be "the transportation of passengers
in railroad cars constructed and to be owned by the said
company" under certain patents. The Pullman's Palace Car
Company was desirous of obtaining a lease of all the cars of
the Pennsylvania corporation, and, in order that all doubt as
to the right of the latter to make such a contract might be
removed, application was made to the Legislature for a special
act, which extended the period of corporate existence for a
term of years, authorized an increase of its capital stock and
-expressly empowered it "to enter into contracts with corporations of this or any other state for the leasing or hiring and
transfer to them, or any of them," of its "railway cars and other
personal property." Eight days after the passage of this act the
lease was executed, and for some sixteen or seventeen years the
company lessee paid the stipulated rental when and as the
same became due. The company lessee, at the end of a nine
months' period for which no rental had been paid, refused to
pay upon the lessor's demand on the ground that the contract
of lease was unauthorized and, therefore, unlawful and void.
In this position the lessee was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States, Mr. Justice GRAY delivering the
opinion. He adopted the view that the corporation lessor,
originally a strictly private corporation organized like large
numbers of others in Pennsylvania under the general manufacturing corporation law, became a quasi-public corporation
with public duties to perform in virtue of the special act,
which increased the duration of its corporate life and authorized an increase of its capital stock. The corporation being, in
this view, a corporation with public duties to perform, it could
make no lease of its property without legislative consent; and
he voiced the opinion of the court to the effect that the legislative authority to make a lease could not, in this case, be construed to authorize a lease of all the property of the corporation, since such a contract would involve the abdication by
the corporation of the powers which it possessed, and the
cessation by it of the performance of the duties imposed upon
it by law. Having decided that the contract of lease was
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' unlawful and void, because it was beyond the powers conferred upon the plaintiff by the Legislature," the court decided
that no performance on either side could give the unlawful
contract any validity or be the foundation of any right of
action upon it. "Whether this plaintiff could maintain any
action against this defendant in the nature of a quantum meruit,
or otherwise, independently of the contract need not be considered, because it is not presented by this record, and has
not been argued. This action, according to the declaration
and the evidence, was brought and prosecuted for the single
purpose of recovering sums, which the defendant had agreed
to pay by the unlawful contract, and which, for the reasons
and upon the authorities above cited, the defendant is not
liable for." Mr. Justice GRAY thus states the reason for the
rule, which is applied in this case: "A contract of a corporation, which is ultra vires in the proper sense, that is to say,
outside the object of its creation as defined in the law of its
its organization, and, therefore, beyond the powers conferred
upon it by the Legislature, is not voidable only, but wholly
void and of no legal effect. The objection to the contract is
not merely that the corporation ought not to have made it,
but that it could not make it. The contract cannot be ratified
by either party, because it could not have been authorized by
-either."
It is clear from this opinion that the Supreme Court of the
IUnited States must have worked out a theory of its own as
to the distinction between a strictly private and a quasi-public
corporation. It is not to be supposed that the court would
have decided that a company organized under a general
manufacturing corporation law was a quasi-public corporation
with public duties to perform had the special act of Legislature been absent from the consideration. That act of Legislature contained but three provisions. The provision authorizing a lease may be disregarded. It certainly could not be
relied upon as indicating a legislative intention to turn a
manufacturing company into a quasi-public corporation,
because the power to lease is confessedlr inconsistent with the
nature of a quasi-public corporation and special permission
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must be obtained from the sovereign, in order to give the
contract validity. It must be, therefore, that the Supreme
Court of the United States holds to the view that an increase
in the term of existence of a manufacturing company or a
permission to increase its capital stock, or both elements conjointly, will be sufficient to work the change. But suppose
that the lengthening of the corporate life and the increase of
the capital stock had been authorized by a general law applicable to all manufacturing corporations ; is it to be supposed
that all the manufacturing companies in the state would then
have become quasi-public corporations without power to lease
their plants ? Such a conclusion would never be reached by
any court. Are we to suppose, then, that the transformation
in this case was wrought in virtue of the circumstance that the
enabling act was a special and not a general law? No reason
occurs to the writer why any significance should be attached
to the distinction; and yet there is no escaping the conclusion
that somewhere within the compass of this short and commonplace act there is contained the provision which creates a
new relation between the corporation and the public, which
gives to the public an added interest in the performance by
the corporation of its functions and imposes upon the corporation new and more serious duties to perform. The practical
conclusion is that manufacturing corporations must beware of
legislation enacted for their benefit, as it is not yet clear what
language will bring about a state of things that is not in
the contemplation of the Legislature which enacts the law,
nor of the corporation which accepts it.
Assuming the corporation to be a quasi-public corporation,
there was abundant authority for the proposition that the
lease, to be valid, must receive legislative sanction. Some
years before, in Thomas v. Railroad Company,,1 the law upon
this point was definitely settled by the Supreme Court. It is
interesting to note, however, that even this conclusion was
questioned by no less distinguished a jurist than Mr. Justice
BRADLEY.
In Pennsylvania Co. et al. v. St. Louis, Alton &
18101

U. S. 71.
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Terre H'awte R, R, Co,,1" decided about five years earlier than
the case under discussion, he filed a dissenting opinion, in
which he made a powerful statement of the reasons why the
English notions on the subject of railway leases are inapplicable to our situation and circumstances, "however well
suited to that compact and homogeneous country." That
was a case, ini which the company lessor had full authority to
make the lease, and the invalidity of the contract depended
upon the lack of power on the part of the lessee to accept it.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY'S language is general, however, and
applies equally well to cases, in which there has been been no
specific grant of authority to make the lease on the part of
the lessor. His position substantially was that the interests of
the public are, as a rule, better subserved by a system of railway leases by which continuous lines for the transportation of
passengers and freight are secured, than would be the case if
transportation across the continent could be obtained only by
means of successive independent lines of railway. It will be
observed that he confined his remarks to leases. There is
nothing in his opinion, which would justify the criticism that
he loses sight of the principle that a franchise to run a railroad is a personal privilege in the sense that it cannot be sold
or transferred absolutely without legislative consent. Four
years before, in Branch v. Jesup,2 which was a case of outand-out sale, Mr. Justice BRADLEY had said: "We do not
mean in the slightest degree to disaffirm the general rule that
a corporation cannot dispose of its franchises to another corporation without legislative authority. But we think that the
authority clearly existed in this case."
It seems, however, in spite of Mr. Justice BRADLEY'S vigorous expression of opinion that the Supreme Court makes no
distinction between a lease and an out-and-out sale. Both
require legislative sanction as a condition of validity wherever the leasing or selling company is a quasi-public corporation. Just why the Act of the Pennsylvania Legislature in the
case under discussion fell short of what is required in such
19ITS

U. S. 290.
20 xo6 U. 9. 468,
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,cases is not clear to the writer. Mr. Justice GRAY speaks of
the "evident purpose" of the Legislature in passing the statute and says, in effect, that a general power to lease cannot
be construed to authorize a general lease, "withoutmuch
clearer expressions of the legislative will looking towards the
,end than are to be found in this statute." This, however, is
probably a question of original apprehension, and is, therefore, one of those points, which it is not profitable to discuss.
The position definitely taken by the court in the matter of
the inability of a plaintiff, who has performed an unauthorized
contract, to recover upon it from the defendant, is a position
full of practical and speculative interest. In his dissenting
opinion, already quoted, Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in the earlier
case, had said: "The contract has been performed on the part
of the lessor company and the lessee, and its guarantors have
enjoyed the benefit of it. With what face can they now
refuse to pay what they agreed to pay? With what face can
they plead incapacity to contract ? This is not a suit to compel the specific performance of tte contract in future; but to
compel the payment of the money earned by past performance
of the contract. It seems to me that the companies concerned
are estopped to deny their liability to make this payment."
He was speaking of a case, in which the corporations which
desired the benefit of a lease had formed a straw corporation
to accept it, and had guaranteed* the payment of the rentals
,accruing to the lessor. The court held, in that case (after
deciding that the straw corporation had no authority to
accept the lease,) that the covenants of guaranty were covenants to insure the doing of a thing itself invalid, and were,
therefore, unenforcible. When a petition for a re-argument
was filed the court refused to hold that the contracts of
guaranty were in substance original covenants to pay rent, the
guarantors being the promoters of the lease and being, in
effect, the original lessees. Although Mr. Justice MILLER, in
form dealt with the case as an ordinary case in which the
-original party in interest was the lessee named in the lease, it
.seems in reality difficult to distinguish the case from Central
Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Company,
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excepting with reference to the fact that in the earlier case it
was the lessee corporation which was incompetent to make
the contract, and in the later case it was the lessor who.
lacked the power. It should seem that Mr. Justice BRADLEY'S
protest was as applicable in the latter case as in the former.
*Mr. Justice GRAY, however, spoke with no uncertain voice.
In addition to the passage from his opinion which has already
been quoted, it is interesting to notice the following extract
"A contract ult-a r'ir-cs being invalid and void, not because it
is in itself immoral, but because the corporation by the law of
its creation is incapable of making it, the courts, while refusing to maintain any action upon the unlawful contract, have
always striven to do justice between the parties so far as could
be done consistently with adherence to law by permitting
property or money parted with on the faith of the unlawful
contract to be recovered back or compensation to be made for
it. In such case, however, the action is not maintained upon
the unlawful contract, nor according to its terms ; but on an
implied contract of the defendant to return, or, failing to do.
that, to make compensation for property or money, which it
has no right to retain. To maintain such an action is not to.
affirm, but to disaffirm the unlawful contract." The distinction between recovery under an express contract, which the
court, in this case, refused to permit, and a recovery of theamount sued for under an implied contract, which is permitted
in many cases, and is not disapproved by Mr. Justice GRAY,.
is a distinction, which is somewhat shadowy and difficult to.
grasp. Why it is that the interests of the public are best
subserved by treating the contract as made by the parties as.
unenforcible and substituting an enforcible contract "implied:
by law" to accomplish the same result is not clear to the
writer. Mr. Justice GRAY'S language just cited seems tocontemplate a recovery in quasi-contract in the original suit
as if the court were dealing with the case of a defendantin default under an illegal agreement. But this cannot be the
basis of a recovery in any case like the one before the court,
because tile rule of law, which invalidates a railway lease
made without legislative authority, is, in no sense, a rule of
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law which exists for the protection of the plaintiff against the
defendant, and the parties to the unauthorized contract are
accordingly to be treated as in pari delicto. In such cases,
it well settled that the plaintiff cannot recover in quasi-contract.2 It should seem, therefore, to be a necessary inference
from the language of the court that a recovery will be permitted (in cases where a recovery is permitted) on the
ground that there is evidence in the case from which an intention upon the part of the defendant to pay may fairly be inferred. In other words, the relief is granted to effectuate the
intention of the parties, and not contrary to the intention of
the defendant. If this is the true theory of the relief, it is
hard to see (as suggested above) why the agreement of the
parties should not be enforced upon the basis of the instrument in which it was expressed, instead of upon the basis of
an inference from the conduct of the parties induced by the
execution of that instrument. The only answer which disposes of this difficulty involves us in a difficulty equally serious. It may be said that the court in refusing to enforce the
agreement as written intends to permit a recovery only in
those cases in which property or money has actually passed
to the defendant on the faith of the unlawful contract and
subsists in the hands of the defendant at the time of suit
brought. But, if we have left the realm of quasi-contract,
and if the basis of relief is a genuine agreement inferred by
law from the conduct of the parties, why limit the recovery
to cases in which there has actually been an unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff? And
why not extend the relief, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, to cover the case in which it was evidently, at the outset, the intention of the plaintiff that he
should be paid and the intention of the defendant to pay him,
although, as affairs have turned out, the defendant has, in
fact, derived no benefit from the contract, but has incurred a
loss ? If this view had been adopted by the court, in Pennsylvania Co. et al. v. St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute R. R. Co.,
(suPra), and, if, in that case, the court had regarded the sub21

See Keener on Quasi-Contracts,page 267, et seq.
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stance of the transaction instead of the form, a recovery
would have been permitted upon the ground that the real
defendants (in form the guarantors) had purchased from the
plaintiff a business opportunity to make a profit under a railway lease, for which opportunity it was evidently the intention of both parties that the defendants should, at all events,
pay. The mere circumstance that the expected profit was
not fully realized should not deprive the plaintiff of his right
to recover on the agreement implied from the conduct of the
parties, nor deprive him of his right to give in evidence the
unenforcible lease for the purpose of proving the valuation
placed by the parties upon the opportunity afforded by the
plaintiff to the defendants. Even, if the court were to refuse
to permit a recovery to this extent, surely upon the theory of
a contract inferred by law from the conduct of the parties, a
recovery should be permitted in such a case as the one under
discussion. In Central Transportation Co. v. Pu//man's Palace
Car Co., there was an actual enrichment of the defendant at
the expense of the plaintiff The defendant had used the
plaintiff's property and had made a profit out of it. Is it
possible that the defendant, on account of the unlawfulness of
the contract, can retain the advantage which he has obtained
at the expense of the plaintiff? The answer of the court is
that, for the purposes of a suit founded upon the unlawfil contract, the response to this question must be in the affirmative,
unless the advantage is money or tangible property, which has
actually passed from the hands of the plaintiff into the hands
of the defendant. The court then proceeds to intimate that
it is an arguable question whether a recovery could be had in
inernit or otherwise."
an independent suit "upon the quantum
Since it is clear that no recovery can be had upon a quasicontractual obligation, and, that, if a recovery is to be permitted at all, it is upon the basis of a genuine contract, it
should seem to be purely arbitrary to permit a recovery in the
original suit in some cases and to drive the plaintiff to an independent suit in other cases; and, in general, to refuse in
any form of action to enforce the contract which the parties*
have made, substituting for it a contract which the parties did
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not make, and enforcing that. In fine, it is difficult to understand, upon principle, how it is, in any cases of this class, that
the court can avoid the conclusion that the contract must be
enforced as it was made, or else that the parties must, in all
cases, be left in the position in which they have placed themselves.
If this dilemma were recognized as sound, it is conceived
that it would not be long before the Supreme Court of the
United States would adopt what is conceived to be the modern
view of unauthorized, and even of prohibited corporate contracts-namely, that they* will be enforced as between the
parties to them precisely as if they were the contracts of
natural persons. The term ultra sires would have, in that
event, no significance except in the case of suits in equity by
stockholders to restrain the making of contracts, or in quo
warrantoproceedings instituted by the state in cases where
such unauthorized or prohibited contracts have been actually
made.
It should seem to be clear from the language of Mr.
Justice GRAY, in Central TransportationCo. v. Pullman's Palace
Car Co.,u that it is the legal duty of a corporation, which is a
party to an unauthorized or prohibited contract "to rescind
and abandon the contract at the earliest moment and the performance of that duty, though delayed for several years," is
"a rightful act when done." If, in the case discussed above,
the lessor, before the defendant had made default in the rentals,
had notified the defendant of his disaffirmance of the contract,
it should seem that he would have been doing no more than
his duty, and that he would have been entitled to recover
from the lessee in quasi-contract for the benefits conferred
upon the defendant under the lease. It will be observed that
in such a case the suit would not be instituted to recover compensation from the defendant or to recover the equivalent of'
what would have been received if the invalid contract were
completely executed. The plaintiff wotld be seeking to be
reinstated in his former position by a return of the property,
22 Page

55.
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which is the subject-matter of the contract.n In such a case,
the inquiry is not as to whether the parties are ih pali delicto,
but as to whether the illegality of the contract is in the nature
of mahim in se or malum prohibitumz. Assuming for the'
purposes of this discussion that there is a real distinctio&
between malum in se arid malum prohibitit, it is clear feorfi
Mr. Justice GRAY'S 6pinion that an unauthorized railway lease
is nalun Prel/bitum merely' The right of the lessor to
recover, therefore, would seem to be undoubted. The
standing of a plaiftiff in such a case was emphatically
recognized in C6tgress Sp;;ing Co. v. Knowlton.' which
carries the doctrine of the plaintiff's right to a recovery under
an illegal con fact sorhewhat farther than any other case
in the books. ft is difficult to understand, therefore, the
meaning of the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Louis,
Vandalia & :Terre Hduite, R. R'. Co. v. Terre Haute and Zndidniapolis R. R. Ceo.2 In that case A railway lease had been made
by plaintiff to defendant, and for a term of sixteen or seventeen
years the defendant had been in possession under the lease and
had paid rental in accordance with its terms. At the expiration of that period, but iong before the end of the term, the
plaintiff fessor filed a bift in equity to set aside and cancel the
lease on the ground of illegality and prayed for a return of the
property. 'he Supreme Court held under the decision in
_Peisylvnia Railroadv. St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute,R. .
(supra), that "the contract in question was ultra zires of the
defendant, and therefore did not bind either party and neilher
party could have maintained a suit upon it at law or in equity
against the other." Mr. Justice GRAY delivered the opiion of
the court, and after using the language just cited, he remarked:
It does not, however, follow that this suit to set aside afid
cancel the contract can be maintained." He proce'eds td
announce that " the general rulei ih equity, as at law, is' ill
pari delicto polior est conditio defendenlis; ard thefdeore ne t er
gee Keener on Quasi-Contracts,piige 62.
24

White v. Frdliklin

2S 163o
U_ S. 40.
26x4i V.S. [1891 .

fftnk,

22 PiSk. i8l.
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par y to an illegal contract will be aided by the court, whether
to enforce it or to set it aside. If the contract is illegal, affirmative relief against it will not be granted at law or in equity
unless the contract remains executory, or unless the parties
are considered not in equal fault, as where the law violated is
intended for the coercion of the one party, and the protection
of the other, or where there has been fraud or oppression on
the part of the defendant: Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wail.
349, 355; Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49; Story Eq.
Jur. Sec. 298." Again he says: " When the parties are in
,paridelicto, and the contract has been fully executed on the
part of the plaintiff, by the conveyance of property, or by the
payment of money, and has not been repudiated by the defendant, it is now equally well settled that neither a court of law
nor a court of equity will assist the plaintiff to recover back
the property conveyed or money paid under the contract:
Thtomas v. Richmond, above cited; Ayerst v. Jenkins, L. R.
i6 Eq. 275, 284." The opinion of the court was that since
the lease was invalid and the parties in pani delicto, and since
the contract had been fully executed on the part of the plaintiff, by the transfer of its property to the defendant, who had
held the property and paid the stipulated consideration for
seventeen years, the court would not grant the relief prayed
for by the plaintiff and would take no steps to compel the
return of the property by the defendant.
Surely there is abundant food for reflection in this decision.
The conclusion is precisely the reverse of what the language
of the court in Central Transportation Coinpany v. Pulman's
Palace Car Co., would lead a lawyer to expect. If there
really is a duty upon the part of a party to an invalid contract,
wholly or in part executory, to take active steps to rescind it
at the earliest possible moment, it is difficult to see why the
court should not be active in effectuating a performance of the
duty. That there is a duty upon the part of a corporation
which has become party to an unauthorized delegation of corporate franchises to endeavor to re-establish the status quo in
favor of an injured public, is a conclusion that seems to follow
logically from the premises recognized by the court. Is it
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possible that the Supreme Court of the United States means to
deny the proposition that a party to an illegal contract, not
wholly executed, may give notice of disaffirmance to a defendant who is not in default and recover from the defendant
such property as will result in putting both parties in the position in which they were before the illegal contract was made?
It should seem that the right is clearly recognized, as already
stated, in Spring Co. v. Knowlton, (supra), and it is not denied
in any of the cases cited by Mr. Justice GRAY in support of his
conclusion. In some of those cases, indeed (as in Thomas v.
Richmond), a recovery was refused, but that was the case in
which the defendant was in default under an illegal contract,
and the plaintiff was declared to be in pai delicto; but where
the defendant is not in default and the illegality of the contract
is malum prohibitum merely, a mass of authority supports the
proposition that the plaintiff is entitled to the aid of the court
to make his disaffirmance of the contract effectual.Y In the
case under discussion an obligation existed, by the terms of
the contract on the part of the defendant, in favor of the plaintiff, to continue the payment of rental for a long term of years.
The court intimates that if the defendant were to refuse to pay,
and (as in the case of Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's
Palace Car Co.), were to make default under the contract, the
plaintiff would have no standing to sue upon the lease for the
unpaid rental. In other words, the position taken in the lastmentioned case is reaffirmed. But if this is so, one of two
results must follow: either, in the event of a default on the
part of the defendant, the court will refuse to permit a recovery
by the plaintiff on a quantum reruit; or the court in such a
case would permit the recovery. If the former alternative is
-adopted, a question left unsolved in the earlier decision must
be taken to be settled against the right of the lessor. If the
latter alternative is adopted, then the decision under discussion
is in substance a decision which permits the continuance of an
illegal arrangement, under which the plaintiff may have the
aid of a court to enforce a claim against the defendant in case
the defendant should ever make default. In other words, the
'2See Keener on Quasi-Contract, p. 258, et seq.
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court announces that the making of an unauthorized leaseis invalid and that it is a menace to the welfare of the public
When the plaintiff desires to terminate it, the court refuses to
lend its aid to effectuate the rescission. When, ultimately, the
defendant makes default and refuses to pay rental for the
period of occupation the court permits a recovery, not, indeed,.
upon ths express contract, but upon a contract implied.
Either conclusion is unsatisfactory, and it may be suggested
with deference that the decision is ingeniously contrived towork to the disadvantage of the public and the plaintiff if
one alternative is adopted, and to the disadvantage of the
public and the defendant if the court accepts the other.
If the result of these decisions were to be summed up in a
series of propositions, it is conceived that those propositions
would be somewhat as follows:
Where an unauthorized corporate contract has been made,.
neither party can maintain an action upon it against the
other.
If one of the parties does institute an action upon the con-tract against the other, the court, while declaring his action
un ounded, will award to him a recovery in that suit of money
or property obtained from him by the defendant upon the
faith of the contradt.
If the claim of the plaintiff cannot be treated specifically as
a claim for property or money obtained by the defendant on
the faith of the contract, he can recover nothing in the original suit upon the express contract.
If the defendant has received any other benefit under the
contract, it is doubtful whether or not the plaintiff will succeed in a suit against- the defendant founded upon a quantum
metwit.
If the suit upon the quantum meruit cannot be maintained,
the lessee under an unauthorized railway lease has the lessor
at his mercy to the extent that he may elect to terminate the
lease at any time, and, upon returning the subject-matter, may
refuse with impunity to make compensation to the plaintiff for
benefits received from the use of it.
If the suit upon the quantum memudt can be maintained, the

